On "Turkish-type" Civil Fascism

We have been analysing the rapid changes and shifts in Turkey's political trajectory in the recent past on the basis of various stages of the process. It is generally difficult to point to a specific moment as the beginning of a major political-historical process. But it is possible to state that the recent authoritarianization process of the regime started mainly in 2011. From that year on, authoritarianism initially proceeded in the form of a Bonapartization process, symbolized in the person of Erdoğan. Afterwards, starting approximately in the second half of 2015, it evolved into a fascist escalation process. Following the July 15 coup attempt, with a new regime based on state of emergency decrees, the fascist escalation process reached a stage of maturity. From this point on, a fascist regime started to be established and institutionalized on the basis of state of emergency. In addition to all this, we emphasize that the fascist regime is yet to be fully institutionalized, and the final milestone in this process is yet to be passed. As the leader of the march to fascism, Erdoğan has covered a considerable distance on this path. But the “Turkish-type” presidential system, which would amount to the actual institutionalization of the new regime, is yet to be established on a legal and constitutional basis. As a matter of fact, the regime is currently in a haste to realize this as soon as possible. We have another fundamental observation about this process: it will not be free of risks, contradictions and fragilities.

On the other hand, when we remember the two forms of fascism, namely military and civilian fascism, it is clear that, unlike Turkey's past experiences, what we are experiencing is a civilian type of fascism, not a military one. In contrast with the 12 September military fascism, the regime that is currently being established did not come to power through a military coup with the army taking power. In this sense, we can say that, for the first time in Turkey’s history, a civilian fascist government is being established. Having come to power through bourgeois democratic procedures, the ruling party and its leader are now establishing a fascist regime.

However, when we look at the civil fascist regimes in recent and distant history, it is equally clear that the fascist escalation process in the case of AKP-Erdoğan exhibits some “non-standard” features, so to speak. In this sense, it is characterised by certain peculiarities. In this article, we will try to identify and clarify these points as much as we can. We will also try to explain why, how and in what sense we call this regime fascist, and what kind of fascism is at stake. In this context, we will address the following questions that may come to mind: Is the AKP a fascist party? Did it come to power in 2002 as a fascist party? Was there a threat of revolution or a rising labour movement that threatened the order? Is there anything like that at the moment? Is it the finance-capital that stays behind this process? Or in other words, does the finance-capital stay behind, support and finance Erdoğan?

In Today’s Turkey, it is clear that even the weak bourgeois democracy has already been strangled. Tens of thousands of people have been imprisoned for political reasons. Thousands of public employees have been dismissed from their jobs, many of whom banned from their professions. Hundreds of media outlets, thousands of associations and foundations have been shut down. Nearly two hundred journalists have been put into prison. The media has been forcibly turned into the mouthpiece of the government. The parliament has been practically invalidated. MPs of the HDP are being imprisoned one after another. Even the semblance of legality in the justice mechanism has disappeared, with arbitrariness becoming dominant. The separation of powers has become practically non-existent. Elections have been turned into plebiscites that are conducted under pressure, threats and intimidation. In Kurdish provinces, elected mayors have been removed from office and imprisoned one after another. Many cities have been razed to the ground by state forces, with hundreds of thousands of dwellers displaced. Paramilitary terror and pacification gangs have become widespread. With constitutional freedoms been shelved, Turkey is now governed by presidential decrees. In addition, the country's army is currently waging a war on the territory of another country, Syria, as an occupying force. Glorified as “reis” [chief], a demagogue leader is now trying to introduce a presidential system that will provide him with absolute powers. Day in and day out, he keeps “talking too much” on screens in our homes and public spaces, just like Mussolini. Chauvinism, militarism and state glorification have become rampant. Military expansionism and an imperialist rhetoric are now being glorified.

When we look at history, it is impossible to find a more appropriate conception than fascism that can describe this picture and the preceding course of events. However, while considering the historical cases, it is also important to correctly interpret and disentangle the peculiarities and similar and distinct aspects of the current process.

Dynamics of the escalation of the AKP-Erdoğan fascism

In its classical cases, civil fascist regimes emerged out of harsh and severe social crises where the dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution worked side by side. In the aftermath of the First World War, Italy and Germany experienced a period of revolutionary depression. In both cases, bourgeoisie paved the path to power for fascist parties in order to eliminate the dynamics of revolution. In essence, this was also the case in Spain in the 1930s. In subsequent periods, it also materialised in the form of military fascism in various countries including Turkey.

The current process in Turkey, however, has not emerged out of such a ground. First of all, the consciousness, organization and struggle of the working class is at a considerably low level. A workers' movement that can pose a threat for the order is yet to emerge. Moreover, the majority of the working class is in favour of the AKP and Erdoğan.

At the current stage, Turkey's big capital circles, mainly embodied in TÜSİAD, are not openly supporting Erdoğan. On the contrary, there is a conflict, a friction between these sections and Erdoğan. There is a serious political division among the capitalists. As a matter of fact, the largest capital groups feel considerably intimidated in the face of the fact that Erdoğan has survived many crises and is still dealing painful blows to his opponents.

In his fight for power, Erdoğan first challenged pro-status quo bourgeois sections whose backbone was the military. During that challenge, his alliance with the Gulenists, who had become a major force within the state, played an important role. He was also supported by the traditional big capital circles on the basis of Turkey’s EU membership program. US and EU imperialism were also on the side of Erdoğan against the army. Over time, however, Erdoğan went too far in terms of the favouring crony capital groups and tending towards shifts in Turkey's traditional foreign policy. As a consequence, these sections of capital withdrew their conditional support and switched to opposition. The most blatant manifestation of this shift was seen during the Gezi protests of 2013. Thus, on the basis of the growing frictions with these capitalist groups over various issues, Erdoğan started to attack them as well.

“Especially since the 2011 elections, such a political behaviour has dominated Erdoğan and his inner circle. But this behavioural change has caused unrest even within the bourgeoisie. The main reason for this unrest is the fact that Erdoğan and the AKP bourgeoisie ignore the bourgeois sections outside their sphere and even try to bring them into line on every occasion. For example, in response to the warnings and critiques from TÜSİAD about the EU reforms and economy, Erdoğan and the government spokespersons always adopted a harsh tone, rebuking them with expressions such as “TÜSİAD should mind its own business”. Over time, TÜSİAD executives became less vocal regarding Erdoğan's actions and refrained from criticizing the government, which points to a relative retreat. However, the fact that TÜSİAD executives are now less vocal and refraining from criticizing the government should not be taken to mean that a voluntary reconciliation and agreement has been reached within the bourgeoisie. Rather, it shows that an Erdoğan-type “peace” (pax Erdoğana) has been imposed on the leaders of TÜSİAD as well.” (Mehmet Sinan, A Bonapartized Erdoğan and the AKP’s Bourgeoisie, November 2012, marksist.com)

In fact, this is one of the vulnerabilities of Erdoğan’s dictatorship. Let alone supporting him, most of the largest capital groups are biding their time for Erdoğan's downfall, which is one of the factors that feed his paranoia. When Hitler came to power, he had the support of the largest capital groups. If Erdoğan manages to introduce a presidential system, maybe this would lead to a similar picture in Turkey. We will see.

The ongoing process contains the elements of both Bonapartism and fascism. We must deal with reality not in a mechanical, rigid, dull way, but with a dialectical rigor. The different elements and tendencies of a phenomena can only be identified with a dialectical rigor peculiar to Marxism. In terms of their external appearances, political forms display a wide variety and transitivity that are determined by many factors such as the historical-social peculiarities of countries, the specific development of social struggles and different degrees of development. Therefore, clear-cut differences are out of question in such matters. For this very reason, there is no need to come up with a new concept for each situation. What is needed is to distinguish between Bonapartism and fascism as the main categories that express the most general tendencies. But this must be done not in a rigid and mechanical way, but in a dialectical manner that takes into account different compositions and interrelations. There was fascism in Italy, in Germany, in Spain, in Portugal, but they were all different from each other. Some of these differences are significant. In order to evaluate political developments correctly, one should neither ignore these differences, nor consider a general concept of fascism as unnecessary. Within this framework, it is clear that this new state of emergency regime has now gone far beyond the concept of Bonapartism, with Erdoğan having effectively usurped all powers after 15 July 2016, suspended basic constitutional democratic rights and enacted laws on his own. In terms of the role it played, 15 July coup attempt is surprisingly similar to the Reichstag Fire. This is an important indication regarding the nature of the ongoing process. It was after the Reichstag Fire that Hitler essentially established his regime, using it as a pretext to acquire dictatorial powers. We should not be misled by the fact that there is still a parliament in Turkey, and there are still a few parties there. In reality, parliament has lost its defined constitutional function. Unless some MPs of the AKP and the MHP abstain for this or that reason, the vote for the new constitutional amendment will be the last gasp of the parliament. If a system like the one envisaged by the current draft constitution is established, the parliament will be a politically castrated institution, a sham stage, completely under Erdoğan's control. The presidential palace will constitute the focal point and the centre of gravity of political life.

Transitional Bonapartism

From the very beginning, Erdoğan was the representative of the Islamist-conservative capital circles and other capitalists that accommodated to them. But until a certain stage in the authoritarianization process, he did not ignore the demands and interests of the traditional big capital circles and maintained a certain degree of balance between these two main factions. During this period, the level of authoritarianism was relatively moderate when compared with the aftermath of the 15 July. In this respect, the period in question can be seen as a transitional period of Bonapartism.

This constitutes a point of similarity that is also seen in various historical cases of fascism. In Germany, the Nazi regime came to power under Hitler’s leadership after a series of Bonapartist transitional governments that took into account the balance of power within the bourgeoisie. Similar phenomena were seen in a number of other European countries such as Austria and France, where similar authoritarianization processes took place in the 1930s. It should be noted that, unlike in Germany, the Bonapartist transition process in France could not be completed and fascism was prevented thanks to the working-class parties and trade unions that managed to act together.

Is AKP a fascist party?

AKP was not a fascist party from the beginning. However, it has gone through a process and this process is still in progress. At the beginning, AKP was a party that contained various tendencies, surely including Islamist-conservative elements. We are talking about a party that was comprised of left-wing and right-wing liberals, elements that had formerly constituted cadres and base of conservative right-wing parties such as the ANAP-DYP type in the past, and of course Islamists of various shades. With such a composition, despite certain hesitations and conditions, the party received the support of the Westernist-secularist sections of big capital, mainly embodied in TÜSİAD. Not long after, however, the liberal elements were purged (Haluk Özdalga, Zafer Üskül, Reha Çamuroğlu etc.). In the latter stages, ANAP-DYP style elements were erased. They were either alienated from the party or transformed. At a relatively recent stage, the most painful wave of purges has taken place, and still continues, with the liquidation of the elements that were part of the initial Islamist core cadres. These latter elements were in most cases the relatively moderate and compromising ones in the old guard.

The AKP as a party is undergoing a fascistization process and it has covered quite a distance on this path. A fundamental dimension of this process is constituted by the waves of liquidation of different factions and the domination of the party by Erdoğan's iron fist on the basis of total obedience. Another dimension is the process of gradual merging of the AKP and the state apparatus. Governors, high bureaucrats, directors of national education and other officials are now almost entirely being recruited from, or turning into, militant AKP cadres.

A third dimension of this process is the formation of a paramilitary force, which is one of the main characteristics of a fascist party. In the last few years, organizations such as Osmanlı Ocakları [Ottoman Hearths] and hooligan circles have been organized as a striking street force. So much so that there has been a serious shift towards the AKP from traditional paramilitary striking forces such as Ülkü Ocakları [Grey Wolves]. Likewise, the mafioso-fascist gangs of the past, as seen in the case of Sedat Peker, are now joining the AKP. In accordance with this new trend, religious sects have also become more deeply embedded within the AKP. On the other hand, as a phenomenon unique to our time, the army of paid “trolls” in the media and social media can also be regarded as a kind of “cyber-fascist” striking force that plays an important role in instilling hatred into the masses.

Fascist transformation process

In the “classical” historical cases of civil fascism, the fascist movements rose to power as grassroots opposition movements. The ongoing process in Turkey, on the other hand, is characterized by a fascist transformation that was initiated by a non-fascist party at some point during its long years in power. This is a peculiarity. Since the start of this process, there has been a transformation that involved the adoption of certain common characteristics of fascist movements and parties. There has been a convergence to the general pattern, including the gradual intertwining of the party and the state, the creation of top-down paramilitary structures, the armament of civilians, ceremonial rituals and mass mobilizations.

Were the Kemalists right?

From the very beginning, the Kemalists had been claiming that the AKP was a “hypocritical” party and that it was going to “exploit democracy” to build a sharia regime. Today, they claim to have been vindicated by the ongoing repression and authoritarianism. They attack the liberals as if they were responsible for everything. Since the main concern and political horizon of the Kemalists is limited to the questions of religion and secularism, they try to squeeze the whole process, which is actually of a different nature, into the narrow perspective of such problems. In fact, the fascist regime of AKP and Erdoğan is not built on religious dynamics or problems. It is rather built on issues such as the resilient Kurdish, the imperialist adventures in the Middle East that reached an impasse, the threat of coups at home and the ambition to stay in power. And these issues had by no means been determined from the beginning, and the Kemalists had not foreseen any of them. On the contrary, the positions adopted by Kemalists on various issues in that period are quite similar to those adopted by today’s AKP. For instance, the Kemalists had a repressive and chauvinist stance on the Kurdish question. They were hostile to the formation of a Kurdish state in Iraq, considering it as a red line. Therefore, they were supporting cross-border operations of the Turkish army.

Secondly, the Kemalists were not right in their claims that the AKP would bring a sharia regime. The fascist regime that is being established today is not based on sharia, but on nationalism, chauvinism, state-worshipping and imperialist expansionism. Today's fascist repression is mainly and primarily targeting the Kurdish movement, Kurdish people and the democrats, revolutionaries and socialists who defend the democratic rights and freedoms of the Kurdish people and stand in solidarity with them, rather than non-religious and secular people or those with different religions and beliefs. It is precisely for this reason that Doğu Perinçek’s Vatan Party [Patriotic Party], the representative of National Socialism in a “left-wing” disguise, and the MHP [The Nationalist Movement Party], Turkey's traditional fascist party, have become voluntary participants or supporters of this trend. Coming from quite different ideological roots, these movements came together in a fascist front. Is it possible to say that such an alignment is based on religion?

Turkey and the international trend of authoritarianism

There is not the slightest doubt that today's world is in the grip of a general tendency towards authoritarianism. Even in the long-established bourgeois democracies, police state practices are being introduced one after another, often under the pretext of “terrorism”. Having long seen as the strongholds of democracy, glittering cities are now turning into garrisons patrolled by armed military units. As part of this process, democratic rights and freedoms are gradually being suspended. Xenophobia and immigrant phobia are on the rise. Asylum and immigrant rights are being curtailed. Fascist, racist and nationalist movements, which had been either non-existent or marginal, are now wrestling for power. When politicians like Trump use a rhetoric in line with this trend and promise to expel migrants, they are not condemned as in the past. Rather, they are now able to come into power. Lies, disinformation and manipulation have reached unprecedented levels.

These are general political facts. Beneath them lies an economic crisis that has been crushing the working class and the toiling masses over the years in the form of ever-increasing unemployment, impoverishment and misery. Social inequality has reached a level without parallel in history. In the face of all this, the working masses, which had been pacified and lulled by the collaborationist political and trade union leaderships for decades, have been getting up off their knees roughly since the 2000s, with mass struggles and resistances beginning to emerge at local levels.

In the aftermath of the “short 20th century”, these phenomena and tendencies are now gaining ground, characterising the last quarter century in the world. It is an indisputable fact that they are all products of the great historical crisis of the capitalist system. Capitalism is indeed undergoing a great and deep system crisis. In addition to the phenomena briefly mentioned above, there is another fact that fits perfectly into the overall picture: the world is once again in the process of an imperialist war of division. Thus emerges a trinity consisting of crisis, war and fascism on a global basis. It is crystal clear that these facts are by no means unrelated or accidental, as they all speak for themselves. But what are the impacts of these general trends and tendencies on the process of authoritarianism and fascism in Turkey? The process in Turkey is strongly linked to Erdoğan's personal ambitions for power, but it is also linked to the developments and trends in the world.

It is important, however, to recognize peculiarities in the case of the AKP. For example, although the AKP and Erdoğan constitute the main pillars of the fascist escalation today, they have not followed a line that foments anti-immigrant sentiment, which is a new phenomenon in Turkey. Rather, they adopted a line that resists this tendency against other bourgeois forces that try to undermine them by playing on such sentiments. Of course, the AKP’s stance is not a product of a progressive and virtuous approach. On the contrary, it emanates from a necessity and functions as an instrument of the expansionist-occupationist-imperialist policy pursued first and foremost in Syria. In conclusion, although Turkey has witnessed a tendency towards immigrant phobia over the last few years, it has not yet turned into a strong and widespread racism as in developed capitalist countries.

On the other hand, due to his expansionist Middle East and Syria policy, Erdoğan, in the process, became a target that the great imperialist powers want to get rid of. In the aftermath of the first wave of purges in the army, the Gülenist organization acted as the main agent of this drive from within. This drive played a role in Erdogan's turn towards authoritarianism, as he sought to avert attacks coming from this side and to stay in power.

There are many other factors that could be listed within the context of the effects of general authoritarianism in Turkey. However, there is no need for such a long list. In general, it is enough to see what kind of connections exist in this relationship. It would still be appropriate to mention one of these other connections. To draw a general picture, we can cite the declaration of state of emergency in advanced countries such as France and Belgium, where certain freedoms have been restricted, while repressions and anti-democratic practices against immigrants are on the rise. Likewise, police brutality against the oppressed masses came to head in many countries, finding its most evident expression in the US. In a similar fashion, the Basque national movement has been subjected to all kinds of repressions in Spain. In short, “negative” examples have become widespread, turning into norms in the entire developed capitalist world. Such an overall picture is making it harder for the advanced capitalist world to criticise Erdoğan or Putin. And when they do criticise, their hypocrisy detracts from their credibility. This reflects itself in the EU’s relations with Turkey and the measures it has taken against Syrian and North African refugees in the recent period. Europe is using Turkey as a shield against immigrants. In return, it plays into the hands of Turkey and Erdoğan, refraining from exerting effective “democratic” pressure on them.

What if it was not Erdoğan?

Crisis, war and authoritarianism, the three main worldwide phenomena, have an obvious impact on the ongoing process in Turkey. Nevertheless, Erdoğan's personal role can by no means be ignored. How and to what extent did he play a role? Like similar figures in history, Erdoğan has played a decisive role. As has become evident in the process, among the high-ranking AKP cadres with leadership potential, no one has been able to perform such a tough and ironhanded leadership as Erdoğan. In reality, there have been many impasses that could have ousted the AKP from power. Such crises brought about many frictions, wobbles, dissolutions and a tendency to retreat in the upper ranks. But at every turn, Erdoğan exerted his authority with an iron fist, which reconsolidated party ranks. We can safely say that without Erdoğan, the AKP would probably have been removed from power in one of such moments. Let us remind that, when the AKP was unable to form a government on its own in the aftermath of the June 2015 elections, it was Erdoğan’s manoeuvres (and undoubtedly the wrong policies pursued by the CHP and the HDP) that nullified the election results. This fact alone is sufficient to illustrate Erdoğan’s personal role.

On the other hand, successive victories in tough power struggles have further puffed up Erdoğan's already inflated ego, encouraging him to exercise unlimited power. This, in return, led those around him to see wisdom in his person and to flatter him even more. And this resulted in power poisoning, known as Hubris in political literature. Erdoğan considers himself a leader who can play a great role not only in Turkey but also in the world. In particular, he dreams of uniting the vast Islamic geography under his leadership. This delusion is undoubtedly one of the factors poisoning him. The regime’s Middle East policies certainly have something to do with this Ottoman-flavoured delusion.

If Erdoğan never existed, there would undoubtedly be no such issue as presidential system today. We can easily claim that. But no one can claim that a bourgeois democracy would blossom in Turkey under non-AKP or non-Erdoğan bourgeois governments, unless there is a powerful working-class movement. On the contrary, authoritarianism of one kind or another would probably still be on the agenda, albeit perhaps with less sharpened edges without Erdoğan. The Turkish bourgeoisie has countless times proved unable to carry out democratic reforms, especially under the heavy pressure of the Kurdish question, which has become an international problem. With the same developments in the Middle East and with the Kurdish movement gaining ground, could alternative bourgeois governments pursue policies that are categorically different from those pursued by Erdoğan? One example should suffice to answer: All the establishment parties, whether inside or outside the parliament, first and foremost the MHP and the CHP, are in favour of the occupationist war resolution of Erdoğan-AKP.

Where to?

Having overcome many setbacks, Erdoğan is now seeking to carry this process to fascist institutionalization. Will he be able to finalize this process like in the case of Hitler? A draft law has already been prepared for presidential system. If this system is established through a referendum, this would lay the foundations of a fascist regime. With all dissident voices stifled, this referendum will essentially amount to a plebiscite imposed by force under the state of emergency. Despite that, Erdoğan is deprived of the support of a large enough majority that would allow him to breathe a sigh of relief. However, the country has already entered a state of war, which provides a completely favourable environment for provocations aimed at mass manipulation. Even so, almost half of the population is opposed to Erdoğan. And the vast majority of these opponents openly hate him. This is an element of instability for Erdoğan. Nevertheless, the scene lacks an organized workers' movement, which represents the biggest advantage for Erdoğan.

It is important to underline that Turkey, in the final analysis, is a medium-sized capitalist country that has reached at most a sub-imperialist level. Hitler's Germany was an advanced capitalist country with a mighty industrial power. It was also one of the great imperialist powers. It is well known that Erdogan's Turkey lacks such a foundation. This is one of the main vulnerabilities for Erdoğan. In the past, fascist regimes in under- and middle-developed capitalist countries used to be formed and sustained with the support of US imperialism. Today, however, US imperialism does not support Erdoğan. On the contrary, as seen in the 15th July Coup Attempt, it wants him to be overthrown. What remains unclear at the moment is the policy that will be pursued by the newly elected president Trump.

On the other hand, Turkey is on the brink of a severe economic crisis, with its economy suffering from serious fragilities. It is clear that this will cause discontent among the working masses who support Erdogan and limit his margin for manoeuvre. Having fallen out with the US and the EU and drawing increasingly closer to Russia, it will be more and more difficult for the regime to distract the working masses under the conditions of the deepening global economic crisis. Moreover, civil fascist regimes in the past always used victories achieved in expansionist wars as the main instrument of manufacturing consent among wide sections of the society. In historical cases, the people were deceived into the imperialist euphoria and the promise of their share from the conquests. For Erdoğan's Turkey, however, the imperialist adventure is already bogged down.

On a ground shaped by Syria, the Middle East and the world economic crisis, time is working against him. That is the reason behind Erdoğan’s hastiness. In recent months, the war in the Middle East has spilled across the border into Turkey. Coupled with the effects of the economic crisis, it is exacerbating the discontent among the masses. Having silenced almost all kinds of opposition, dissident media and debates through the emergency state regime, Erdoğan wants to make his move before discontent grows further.

In sum, despite all his victories on the path to establishing a one-man regime, Erdoğan's position is still ambivalent. Even the presidential plebiscite is on thin ice at the moment. Yet, even if he manages to introduce the presidential system, the existing vulnerabilities will largely remain.